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THE POWER OF UNITED STATES COURTS TO DENY
FORMER HEADS OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM
JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION
A number of lawsuits have recently been filed in the federal dis-
trict courts of Hawaii,' California2 and New York3 against the de-
posed president of the Republic of the Philippines, Ferdinand E.
Marcos,' for acts he committed during his reign. In each case,
Marcos has claimed immunity from jurisdiction in the United
States courts.5 Although Marcos is no longer recognized by the
United States as the lawful president of the Philippines6 and the
1. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, civil no. 86-0213 (D. Hawaii July, 18,
1986); Sison v. Marcos, civil no. 86-0225 (D. Hawaii July 18, 1986); Trajano v. Marcos,
civil no. 86-0207 (D. Hawaii July 18, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos, civil no. 86-390 (D. Hawaii
July 18, 1986).
2. Ortigas v. Marcos, civil no. c-86-0975-sw (N.D. Cal. July, 1986); Clemente v.
Marcos, civil no. c-86-1449-sw (N.D. Cal. July 1986); Guinto v. Marcos, civil no. 86-0737
R(CM) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1986). Ortigas and Clemente have been consolidated with Si-
son, Trajano and Hilao (See supra note 1) for the purposes of appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
See Sison v. Marcos, civil no. 86-2496 (9th Cir. 1987), Appellant's Brief.
The United States, in response to a request by the Ninth Circuit, filed an Amicus Curia
brief in support of dismissal of the actions. The United States's main argument was that 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (see infra note 115 and accompanying text) did not give the district courts
subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by a foreign national plaintiff against a foreign govern-
ment official based on acts occurring in a foreign country. See Trajano, supra, brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, at 3. In response, a group of international law professors
will be submitting an Amicus Curia brief in support of granting jurisdiction on the issues of
28 U.S.C. § 1350 and the Act of State Doctrine. The Ninth Circuit had not rendered a
decision at the date of the publication of this Comment.
3. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 640 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y) affd, 806
F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
4. The Philippines were ruled by Marcos for 20 years, 13 of which were under mar-
tial law. In February, 1986, an election was held. Opposition leader, Corazon Aquino, the
widow of slain former Senator Benigno Aquino, lost. The election was "tainted by ballot
stealing and bloodshed." Tifft, Rebelling Against Marcos, TIME, March 3, 1986, at 38.
Then, in March, the people of the Philippines revolted and Aquino became president. And
according to the government, 343 deaths occurred as a result of Aquino's taking office; 32
less than the average of 375 casualties each month during the last year of the Marcos re-
gime. Iyer, Purging Marcos' Legacy, TIME, April 7, 1986, at 32.
5. See supra note 1.
6. In February of 1986, Secretary of State, George Shultz announced the following
to U.S. Embassies around the world: "The president (of the United States) is pleased with
the peaceful transition to a new government of the Philippines. The United States extends
recognition to this new government headed by President Aquino .. " Ortigas, supra note
2, Plaintiff's Points and Authorities in Opposition to defendant Marcos' Motion to Dismiss,
at 4 (citing U.S. Dept. of State unclassified cable no. 57827 (Feb. 25, 1986)).
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State Department has made no Suggestion of Immunity,7 the
courts have dismissed actions against the former head of state.
Their reasoning is based on the judicially created Act of State Doc-
trine,8 which states that courts will not sit in judgment on the acts
of a foreign government done within its own territory,9 leaving the
issue of immunity blurred.
Today there is no universally accepted standard under which
heads of state may be granted immunity from United States juris-
diction."0 The United States courts' difficulty in resolving this issue
stems from the tensions between the functions of the judicial and
executive branches of government.1" As a result of the unsettled
doctrine of head of state immunity, United States courts are strug-
gling to solve the difficult issue of whether former heads of state are
entitled to immunity from jurisdiction.12
This Comment first traces the origins of head of state immunity
through sovereign immunity, which, until about 1900, was based
internationally on an absolute theory.13 In 1952 the United States
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. " This limited
the grant of immunity from jurisdiction to foreign states in litiga-
tion arising from public acts.'"
Next, this Comment discusses how, prior to the enactment of the
FSIA,'6 the United States courts applied the Act of State Doc-
7. Records of the U.S Department of State do not state that Marcos is entitled to
any immunity. Id. See infra note 43 and accompanying text for an explanation of "Sugges-
tions of Immunity."
8. The United States Supreme Court developed the Act of State Doctrine in order
to address the issue of immunity when the courts lack guidance from the State Department.
Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Rights of Kings,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 176 (1986) [hereinafter Note]. For details see infra notes 52-60 and
accompanying text.
9. Lengel, The Duty of Federal Courts to Apply International Law: A Polemical
Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U.L. L. REV. 61 [hereinafter Lengel]; Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1987).
10. Note, supra note 8. The judicial branch's function of supplying due process and
the executive branch's function of conducting foreign affairs.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 288-
89 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter SWEENY, OLIVER, & LEECH] (A government cannot be sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of another against its will.)
14. Id. at 305. The Tate Letter stated that the State Department would follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction in the United States.
15. Id. at 289. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1330, et. seq. (1976). The FSIA was enacted mainly to define (1) the
jurisdiction of United States courts in suits against foreign states and (2) the circumstances
in which foreign states are immune from suit in the United States. Carl, Suing Foreign
Governments In American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in
Practice, 33 Sw. L. J. 1009, 1068 (1979). Until 1976 when Congress enacted the FSIA,
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trine17 to issues of immunity in an effort to avoid conflicts with the
executive branch. Although judicial and legislative exceptions to
this doctrine were later created, the guidelines for granting head of
state immunity were still unclear. The FSIA attempted to provide
United States courts with a clearer standard and has since deter-
mined issues of states' sovereign immunity.
Moreover, this Comment will show that although the FSIA
failed to establish guidelines for head of state immunity, 8 a flexible
interpretation of its language along with an analysis of United
States case law may provide courts with a workable standard.
Finally, this Comment analyzes recent United States court deci-
sions and proposes a guideline for the courts in deciding when for-
mer heads of state should be granted immunity. This proposal cate-
gorizes the acts of the former head of state who is found within the
United States territory into three parts: (1) public or official acts
designed to support a private interest and committed while the
ruler was acting head of state; (2) commercial and private acts
designed to support a private interest and committed while the
ruler was acting head of state; and (3) any acts committed in viola-
tion of United States laws by a foreign head of state who is no
longer in power and no longer recognized as a foreign sovereign by
the United States. The difficulty lies in categorizing the acts of the
former head of state.
To simplify the analysis, this Comment encourages the applica-
tion of the FSIA so that the resolution of the issue is left to the
courts instead of the executive branch.' 9 If the acts fall within the
first category, the former head of state should be granted immunity
from jurisdiction. In the reverse, if the acts fall within categories
two or three, immunity should be denied. Further analysis of this
proposal appears later. In conclusion, when the acts committed by a
former head of state either violate his own states' laws or interna-
tional law and foreign affairs concerns of reciprocity are no longer
American Courts relied on the State Departments Suggestions of Immunity. Note, supra
note 8 at 171; see infra note 43 for State Department procedures. Briefly, a Suggestion of
Immunity is a letter requesting that the court refrain from adjudicating the matter.
17. The Act of State doctrine simply means that the courts of the United States
would not sit in judgment on the acts of a foreign government which were done within its
own territory. See also infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
18. Note, supra note 8, at 171.
19. Suggestions of Immunity are made by the State Department through both a po-
litical and administrative process. Commonly by letter, the State Department informs the
Department of Justice that immunity should be granted to the sovereign. The Justice De-
partment then forwards it to the court hearing the case. Note, supra note 8 at 176.
1988]
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at issue, that former ruler should not be afforded the privilege of
immunity.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Doctrinal Origins of Head of State Immunity
Head of state immunity evolved from the international law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.2 0 Until about 1900, the international
law of sovereign immunity was absolute.21 The doctrine was based
on the theory that the ruler and the state were one.22 Therefore,
acts committed by the ruler were considered acts committed by the
state. This entitled a head of government to immunity for any acts
done in his official capacity if the suit was one brought against the
state.2"
Because governments universally recognized reciprocal indepen-
dence as fundamental to international law, one government could
not subject another government to its jurisdiction against its will.24
States declined to exercise their territorial, personal jurisdiction
over a sovereign because of international comity.26 Comity induced
sovereign states to respect the independence and dignity of others.2"
In the United States, Chief Justice Marshall first explained the
absolute sovereign immunity doctrine in The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Fadden:27
A foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject him-
self to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity
of his nation, and it is to avoid this subjection that the license
(exemption from arrest or detention) has been obtained. . . . This
security, however, need not be expressed; it is implied from the
circumstances of the case. . . . A second case, standing on the
same principles as the first, is the immunity which all civilized
nations allow to foreign ministers.28
20. Note, supra note 8, at 171. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 288.
21. Id.
22. See Statute of International Court of Justice art. 34 § 1, 59 Stat. 10-55, T.S. No.
993 (1945); 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-81 (2d ed. 1970).
23. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 296.
24. Id. at 288.
25. The Ninth Circuit explained international comity and reciprocal independence by
stating, "We do not wish to challenge the sovereignty of another nation, the wisdom of its
policy, or the integrity and motivation of its action." Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976).
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
28. Id. at 137-38.
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American courts refused to adjudicate any controversy to which a
foreign sovereign was a necessary party.29 In a sense, heads of state
were granted a blanket immunity for their acts. When heads of
state began to act privately, the doctrine changed.
B. A More Restrictive Doctrine Develops
During the early 1900s, some states"0 developed the judicial
practice of denying a foreign state immunity from jurisdiction in
cases involving commercial or private acts.3" Restricting the appli-
cation of the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity resulted from
increased government activity in commercial enterprise.. The rea-
soning of the states that favored the restriction was that the tradi-
tional rule of immunity did not extend to acts other than those of a
public nature.33 More recently the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in support of the restrictive theory, stated that by denying
immunity to foreign states in cases involving commercial activities,
courts may accommodate two opposing interests: those of individu-
als doing business with foreign governments in having their legal
rights determined by the courts; and those of foreign government in
being free to perform certain political acts without undergoing the
embarrassment or hinderance of defending such acts before foreign
courts.34 The courts of socialist states typically have not drawn the
same distinction, extending immunity despite the nature of the act
involved. 35
29. 1979 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int'l L. 897; civ. no. c-78-291 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1978).
30. The restrictive theory of immunity began-in civil law systems. See SWEENY, OLI-
VER & LEECH supra note 13 at 189. The United States adhered to the absolute theory until
1952, when the Tate Letter stated that when acting on requests for sovereign immunity, the
State Department would follow the restrictive theory of immunity. They would grant immu-
nity only for official public acts. Note, supra note 8 at 173.
31. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13 at 189. In 1903, the Supreme Court of
Belgium in Societe Anonyme des Cheminis de Fer Liegoois Luxemborgeois v. the Nether-
lands made a distinction between public and commercial acts as follows:
Sovereignty is involved only when political acts are accomplished by the state...
however, the state is not bound to confine itself to a political role, and can, for the
needs of the collectively, but, own, contract, become creditor or debtor, and engage
in commerce. . . . In the discharge of these functions, the state is not acting as a
public power, but does what private persons do, and as such, is acting in a civil and
private capacity.
(1903) Pas. 1, 294, 301.
32. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1966);
Victory Transports, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964).
33. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 31.
34. Victory Transports, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. Socialist states are committed to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. They
1988]
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Today, heads of state are no longer viewed as one with the
state.36 Yet because they perform diplomatic duties for their state,
the issue of their immunity may be based on principles similar to
diplomatic immunity." Still, there is no universally recognized ba-
sis for head of state immunity, which makes the resolution of for-
mer head of state immunity even more difficult.38 The United
States courts have deferred the issue, whenever possible, to the ex-
ecutive branch.
II. UNITED STATES' APPROACH TO HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
AND ITS APPLICATION TO FORMER HEADS OF STATE
A. Judiciary's Reliance on the Executive
American courts relied on the State Department's decisions on
sovereign immunity from the mid-1930s until 1977, 3" when the
FSIA went into effect.4" In Ex Parte Republic of Peru," and Re-
public of Mexico v. Hoffman,'2 the United States Supreme Court
stated that Suggestions of Immunity, submitted by the State De-
partment,43 bind federal courts. These decisions required the judici-
ary to accept a Suggestion of Immunity as a "conclusive determi-
look upon the denial of immunity in cases involving commercial activities as an unwarranted
interference with their trade abroad. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 292.
36. Id. at 296.
37. Note, supra note 8, at 170 n. 10. Prior to 1978, the existing statute on United
States diplomatic immunity was the Act of April 30, 1970, ch. 90, 1 Stat. 1217. This Act
was replaced by the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 245a-254e and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1351, 1364), which established
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 (April 18, 1961), as the "sole United States law on the subject." S. Rep. No.
393, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Con. & Admin. News 1935. Article
31 of the Vienna Convention provides that a diplomatic agent shall be immune from the civil
jurisdiction of the "receiving" state's court.
38. Note, supra note 8, at 170.
39. Id. at 171. See Carl, supra note 16, at 1012, n. 17. It is suggested that such
judicial deference is compelled by the consitutional Political Question Doctrine, which main-
tains that judicial determinations would interfere with the powers of the executive branch in
conducting foreign affairs.
40. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 310. See Note, supra note 8, at
169; Congress enacted the FSIA in order to transfer the authority to determine when Na-
tions are immune from United States jurisdiction from the State Department to the Judici-
ary. However, this legislation failed to establish head of state immunity guidelines.
41. 318 U.S 578, 588-89 (1942).
42. 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Suggestions of Immunity are made by
the State Department through a political and administrative process. Yet, these recommen-
dations taken together fail to create a stable body of law. First, the State Department deter-
mines whether an official is entitle to immunity. Then usually by letter, the State Depart-
ment informs the Department of Justice, who forwards it to the court that is hearing the
case. Note, supra note 8, at 176.
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nation by the political arm of the government" that retaining
jurisdiction would jeopardize foreign relations." The practice of al-
lowing the State Department to control the grant of immunity was
followed only by the United States. 5
The State Department used international law authorities" and
principles derived from diplomatic immunity 7 in making determi-
nations as to whether it should issue Suggestions of Immunity. In
Carrera v. Carrera,4 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that immunity attached to a foreign sov-
ereign as long as the case met the following conditions: (1) an am-
bassador had requested immunity;49 (2) the State Department had
recognized that person, for whom it was requested, was entitled to
it;50 and (3) that the Department's recognition had been communi-
cated to the court.51
Yet, the State Department did not always recommend immunity.
The United States courts developed what is now known as the Act
of State Doctrine to determine whether immunity should attach to
a foreign head of state.
B. Application of the Act of State Doctrine
In the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the
executive branch, the United States courts must independently de-
cide whether immunity will attach to the foreign state.52 Thus,
when the courts lack guidance from the State Department, they
have authority to decide immunity cases involving heads of state. 3
The issue of whether to invoke this judicial doctrine "is ultimately
and always a judicial question.154 Although the Act of State Doc-
trine is based on the same principles of immunity, the two doctrines
44. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, supra note 41, 318 U.S at 589-590.
45. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 301. (No other foreign state con-
sidered Suggestions of Immunity binding by the courts.)
46. Note, supra note 8, at 176, n. 30.
47. Note, supra note 8, at 176.
48. 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949). (Carrera was one of many decisions com-
piled in a list by the State Department from May 1952 to January 1977; see 1977 DIG. U.S.
Prac. Int'l L. 1017.)
49. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496.
50. id.
51. Id.
52. Mexico v Hoffman, 324 U.S 30, 34-35 (1945); Victory Transports, Inc. v. Comi-
saria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964). Ex
Parte Republic of Peru 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1942).
53. Note, supra note 8, at 181.
54. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 at 358 (2d Cir. 1986).
1988]
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are separate and distinct.
The United States Supreme Court developed the Act of State
Doctrine from the international rule that one sovereign cannot be
sued in the courts of another without the sovereign's consent.5" Be-
cause every sovereign must respect the independence of every other
sovereign, the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory.56
This doctrine derives from the judiciary's concern for its possible
interference with conduct of foreign affairs.57 United States law
does not require "blindly giving effect to the act of a foreign sover-
eign without having due regard to the rights of its own citizens, or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." 58 Thus,
the doctrine has been both legislatively59 and judicially6 ° narrowed.
1. Legislative Narrowing-The doctrine was legislatively nar-
rowed by the Hickenlooper 1 Amendment in response to Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.62 In Sabbatino, the Court made its
most important judicial pronouncement concerning the United
States' posture toward international law. 8 Sabbatino extended sov-
ereign immunity and comity principles to persons who were not di-
rect agents of the sovereign."4
In Sabbatino, Banco Nacional, a financial agent for the Cuban
government, claimed title to certain sugar by virtue of the Cuban
government's nationalization of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-
Cameguey de Cuba's (C.A.V.) property. C.A.V. was the company
55. Lengel, supra note 9.
56. Id.
57. Traditionally in international law, this principle existed and was termed ratione
personae. It applied only where a sovereign or its agent was the respondent in any legal
proceeding. This doctrine expanded the scope of protection accorded a sovereign. Id.
58. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (lth Cir.
1984).
59. See infra notes 61, 75-76 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
61. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (2) (1976). In large part, the second Hickenlooper Amend-
ment reiterates Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino and mandates that the courts decide
cases effecting a title or right to property that has been confiscated in violation of interna-
tional law. Lengel, supra note 9, at 65. This rule was reiterated again in Ramirez de Arel-
lano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (1984), where the court held that expropriation of any
United States citizen's property by any country when no compensation is given within six
months is in violation of international law.
62. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd 376
U.S. 398 (1964).
63. Id.
64. Lengel, supra note 9, at 64. (See also, supra notes 30 and 49 and accompanying
text.)
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that shipped the sugar.6"
Farr, Whitlock & Co. (Farr) had contracted to purchase sugar
from a subsidiary of C.A.V. The sugar, intended for Farr, was put
on a German ship, which was later detained by the Cuban govern-
ment pursuant to the nationalization order. In order to get the ship-
ment released, Farr entered into a new agreement with a govern-
ment-owned corporation to buy the sugar under the same terms.
Upon presentation of the paperwork in New York, Farr sold the
sugar and did not pay the proceeds to Banco Nacional de Cuba.6
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the United States no longer recognized sovereignty
and comity when the act of a foreign state violated the standards
imposed by international law.67 The court concluded that the expro-
priation of C.A.V.'s property was discriminatory because it applied
only to the United States." Furthermore, it was without just com-
pensation and in violation of international law.69
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
reversed, stating:
The judicial branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign govern-
ment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of the
suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint al-
leges that the taking violated customary international law.70
Justice White was the only dissenter. He stated that he did not
believe that the Act of State Doctrine required American courts to
decide cases in disregard of international law.1 After tracing the
history of the Act of State Doctrine, White wrote that the case law
did not imply that the court "woodenly apply" the Act of State
Doctrine and "grant enforcement to a foreign act" where the act
was clearly a violation of international law. 2 Citing The Paquete
Habana," White concluded that international law was part of the
65. 193 F. Supp. 376.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 381.
68. Id. at 386.
69. Id.
70. 376 U.S. 428.
71. Id. at 439.
72. Id. at 443.
73. 176 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) The Paquete Habana is a well known case supporting
the principle that customary international law is part of the law of the United States. Justice
Gray, writing for the majority, stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
1988]
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law of the United States and must be followed by the United States
courts.74As a result of Sabbatino, Congress narrowed the Act of
State Doctrine by passing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. 71
Portions of the Act focused on the Act of State Doctrine, and they
are now known as the second "Hickenlooper Amendment. '76 This
reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the
United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect
the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of
title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a
foreign state . . . based upon ...a confiscation or other taking
...by an act of state in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law, including the principles of compensation. .. .
2. Judicial Narrowing-The Bernstein exception 78 is one way
in which the doctrine was judicially narrowed. In Bernstein v. N. V
Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Etc., 9 a case dealing with the con-
fiscation, by force, of an American's property by Nazi officials, the
State Department advised the Second Circuit Court of Appeals by
letter that the Act of State Doctrine should not be applied to bar
consideration of the claim.80 The court held that where the execu-
tive publicly advises the court that the Act of State Doctrine need
not be applied, the court should proceed to examine the legal issues
raised by the act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory as it
would any other legal question.81 This rule became known as the
Bernstein exception.
For the first time, a plurality of three justices of the United
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs an usages of civilized nations, and as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators ...
74. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbitino, 376 U.S. 398, 453 (1964).
75. Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1976)). Con-
gress' amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which came to be known as the Hick-
enlooper Amendment, laid down a set of standards to what Congress assumed customary
international law requires of a state that nationalizes the economic interests of an American
citizen or corporation. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 391.
76. Lengel, supra note 9, at 65.
77. 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (2) (1976). See also, supra note 61.
78. The Bernstein exception was created as a result of Bernstein v. N.V. Neder-
landsche Amerikaansche Etc. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
79. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
80. Id. at 376.
81. Id.
(Vol. 18
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss2/4
DENYING FORMER HEADS OF STATE IMMUNITY
States Supreme Court adopted and approved the Bernstein excep-
tion in First National City Bank v. Banca Nacional de Cuba.82 The
petitioner, First National City Bank, had loaned $15 million to a
predecessor of respondent Banco Nacional. 83 The loan was secured
by a pledge of United States Government bonds.8 Meanwhile, the
Castro government came to power in Cuba, and the Cuban militia,
pursuant to decrees of the Castro government, seized all of a peti-
tioner's offices in Cuba.85 A week later, the bank retaliated by sell-
ing the collateral. 86 Respondent sued petitioner in Federal District
Court to recover the amount petitioner had gained from the sale.87
Petitioner counterclaimed, asserting damages as a result of the ex-
propriation of its Cuban property.88
Since the State Department notified the court that it should pro-
ceed to decide the case on its merits, citing Bernstein, Justice
Rehnquist concluded:
Where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary re-
sponsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly repre-
sented to the court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing, we of
course adopt and approve the so called Bernstein exception to the
act of state doctrine. 9
The Act of State Doctrine was further narrowed, by limiting the
grant of immunity to acts which are jure imperii,90 or public, in
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba.9' A plurality of the United
States Supreme Court held that in order for there to be an act of
82. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
83. Id. at 760.
84. Five million was paid and the balance was later renewed for one year. Id.
85. Id. at 761.
86. Almost $1.8 million over the principal and unpaid interest was realized from the
sale. Id. at 761.
87. Id. at 761.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 768.
90. The distinction between acts which are jure imperii (public) and those which are
jure getionis (private and not afforded immunity) has never been adequately defined. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Victory Transports, inc. v. Comisaria General de Abas-
tecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), adopted the following:,
jure imperii would be limited to the following:
(1) internal administrative acts;
(2) legislative acts;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity;
(5) public loans.
91. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
19881
11
Damiani: The Power of United States Courts to Deny Former Heads of State I
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
state immunity, the act in question must be public and not com-
mercial.92 The Act of State Doctrine, like sovereign immunity,
should not immunize foreign sovereigns when they have acted in a
commercial capacity because such acts could be conducted by pri-
vate individuals or entities.9 s In other words, commercial acts do
not further a state's public interest and are therefore not protected
political acts.94
The "private act" exception is also explained in Jimenez v. Aris-
teguieto.9 5 There the fifth circuit created an exception to the Act of
State Doctrine in cases where the executive branch does not oppose
inquiry by American courts into the legality of foreign acts.96 This
case, which deals with a former head of state, reflects the theory
that when former heads of state act outside the scope of their offi-
cial authority in that they are in no way directed at a public inter-
est, immunity should not attach and the Act of State Doctrine
should not apply.97
In Jimenez, the Republic of Venezuela filed an international ex-
tradition proceeding for the return to Venezuela the former presi-
dent, appellant Marcos Perez Jimenez, who was charged with sev-
eral financial crimes.98 The court held that even though he was
characterized as a dictator, appellant was not the sovereign govern-
ment of Venezuela. He was a chief executive, and only when for-
eign officials act in an official capacity does the Act of State Doc-
trine apply. 99
The court held that acts constituting the financial crimes of em-
bezzlement, fraud, breach of trust, and receiving money knowing it
to have been unlawfully obtained were not acts of Venezuela sover-
eignty and were in fact "as far from being an act of state as
rape." 10 The Act of State Doctrine did not bar the adjudication of
the claim because his acts were of a private nature."' The court
92. See supra notes 31 and 91 and accompanying text.
93. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction v. Provisional Mil. Gov., 729 F.2d 422, 425 (1984).
See also, The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
94. See supra note 31 for a distinction between public and private acts.
95. 311 F.2d 547 (1963).
96. SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 371. (This exception was recog-
nized by the court 10 years before the U.S. Supreme Court officially adopted and approved
the Bernstein exception in First National City Bank v. Banca Nacional de Cuba 406 U.S.
759 (1972). (See supra note 55, 56 and 59 and accompanying text).
97. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 371.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 372.
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also stated that the executive branch manifested its intent to allow
the judiciary to decide the case on its merits. 02
In addition, the Sixth Circuit held in Kalamazoo Spice Extrac-
tion v. Provisional Mil. Gov.,' that a treaty provides an exception
to the Act of State Doctrine. The United States and Ethiopia
signed a 1953 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations which pro-
vided that property of nationals would not be taken except for a
public purpose; nor would such property be taken without just com-
pensation.'04 Because the treaty gave the court jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, "federal question jurisdiction,"' 1 5 it was able to
decide whether the Act of State Doctrine would bar the claim from
being heard.'0 6
Jimenez and Kalamazoo Spice stand for the proposition that
United States courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising
under the laws and treaties of the United States. In the absence of
the executive branch's express intent to have the judiciary decide
the case on its own merits such a decision is solely up to the judici-
ary. ' 7 When a court merely passes judgment on traditional ques-
tions of law and fact, it should not be divested of jurisdiction to
hear the claim. 08 Regardless of political context, issues of conver-
sion and breach of fiduciary duty do not involve "political dogma so
as to divest the court of jurisdiction.' 90
102. Id. Because the United States had an agreement with Venezuela for the extradi-
tion of persons charged with crimes such as embezzlement, the court had a legitimate rule of
law to apply. In the absence of a treaty, extradition would not be allowed. (See supra notes
84 and accompanying text and infra note 161 and accompanying text.)
103. 729 F.2d 422 (1984).
104. Id.
105. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
106. The court recognized a "treaty exception" to the Act of State Doctrine.
Kalamazoo, 729 F,2d 422.
107. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 357, 358 (2d Cir. 1986).
108. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 464 N.Y.S. 2d 487, 495 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1983)
(Fein, J., dissenting).
109. Id. For an extreme view on which branch of government should impose the doc-
trine of former head of state immunity see Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity: A Proposed
Statutory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97 YALE L.J. 299 (1987). There, the author suggests that
the doctrine be employed by the President "to encourage embattled foreign leaders to leave
their home countries swiftly and perhaps more peacefully than they otherwise would." The
Note can not be supported by any authority which vests such a power in the Presidential
office or which grants the Legislature the authority to confer such power to the President.
Further, the author puts too much weight on the need for swift and peaceful foreign leader
transitions to the United States and not enough weight on individual plaintiffs' rights to seek
redress for harm caused by ex-leaders and the duty of all nations to uphold, not violate,
international norms.
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C. Jurisdictional Aspects
The issues of Act of State and former head of state immunity
may never be reached if a United States court finds that there is no
jurisdiction. Since United States courts have been struggling with
these jurisdictional problems,110 it is necessary to explain the juris-
dictional aspects before continuing with the immunity and Act of
State doctrines. Many of the recent cases dealing with former head
of state Ferdinand Marcos11 concern acts committed by the de-
posed President while he was in reign in the Philippines. Although
personal jurisdiction was found over him because he was living in
Hawaii, subject matter jurisdiction posed a problem with the
courts." 2
Subject matter jurisdiction may be had if the case is a civil ac-
tion arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States,113 or if the case is a civil action where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds $10,000 and is between citizens of the United States
and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.11 " The district courts
may also have original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien
for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.1 '
In cases where there is no diversity of citizenship, an alien plain-
tiff who is suing a former, foreign head of state must get jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 (federal question jurisdiction),
on a theory that international law is part of our law" 6 or 28 U.S.C.
section 1350 (alien tort jurisdiction or the Alien Tort Claims Act).
The United States circuit courts are struggling with the issue of
whether the Alien Tort Claims Act should extend jurisdiction to
suits between aliens or to private actions for violations of interna-
tional law. 17
Even if a United States court found jurisdiction under any one of
110. See supra note 2; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, civil no 86-7602, 7603 (Sept. 11, 1987) where
the Filartiga rationale was reiterated: "if an alien brings a suit for a tort only, that suffi-
ciently alleges a violation of the law of nations, then the district court has jurisdiction."
See also, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 726 F. 2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985) for an opposing view from Filartiga.
111. See supra notes 1 and 2.
112. Id.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
116. See supra note 73.
117. See supra note 2 and see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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the above sections, there maybe cases where comity dictates pro-
tecting the foreign act because it is not clearly condemned under
generally accepted principles of international law.11 United States
courts are competent to apply international law" 9 which provides
an ascertainable standard for adjudicating the validity of some for-
eign acts.
III. MODERN APPLICATION OF FORMER HEAD OF STATE
IMMUNITY
A. Developing Immunity in Recent Case Authority
In a recent case against Ferdinand E Marcos,' Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos,12' the Central Bank of the Philippines sued
Marcos to recover the currency, negotiable instruments and gold
which Marcos brought with him to the United States via a United
States military aircraft. 22 The plaintiff founded jurisdiction upon
28 U.S.C. section 2463 (ownership dispute jurisdiction) 2 ' and sec-
tion 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). 24
The court held that ownership dispute jurisdiction under 28
118. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1512 (1984); Allied Bank
Intern. v. Banco Credito Agricolo de Catago, 757 F.2d 516, 521-22 (1985). Principles of
international law may be found in the convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and others. (See SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH supra note
13, Documentary Supplement 56, 60, 66 and 87).
119. Treaties and executive agreements between two countries also provide an ascer-
tainable standard for adjudicating the validity of foreign acts (see supra note 84 and accom-
panying text, for example).
120. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
121. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, civ. no. 86-0213 (D. Hawaii July 18,
1986).
122. In March, 1986, Marcos fled to the United States into a $1.5 million estate in
eastern Honolulu, Hawaii. The Philippines does not have an extradition treaty with the
United States, so having Marcos brought back to the Philippines is another problem plain-
tiffs must overcome. Presently the items are in the custody of the United States Customs
Service. Iyer, Purging Marcos' Legacy, TIME, April 7, 1986, at 32, 33.
As a result of Customs' detention of the goods, Ramon Azurini, Marcos' assistant, sought
a writ on mandamus to compel the customs service to release the property. The United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted the writ, and the customs service
appealed. The ninth circuit in reversing the district court's decision in Azurini v. Von Arab,
803 F.2d 993, 25 E.R.C. 1431 (9th Cir. 1986) that since the customs service did not have a
clear ministerial duty to ignore the dispute over the legal ownership of the property, the writ
could not be upheld.
123. "All property taken or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall
not be repleviable, but shall be . . . subject only to the orders . . . of the courts of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof."
124. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the constitution, law or treaties of the United States."
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U.S.C. § 2463 allowed the court to decide the dispute of ownership
of the property." 5 The court rejected Central Bank's argument that
its claim, that Marcos violated Philippine currency laws, was cogni-
zable under the federal question jurisdiction." 6 Its reasoning indi-
cated that although the United States may be willing to respect the
effect of foreign currency laws, such laws do not raise a claim
founded on federal common law, which is necessary to give the
court federal question jurisdiction.2 7 In addition, the court briefly
discussed the issue of former head of state immunity'2 8 by recog-
nizing the fact that the issue was unresolved.'29
Head of state immunity arises from principles of international
comity, not common law privilege. 30 After discussing the Act of
State doctrine and its application to heads of state, the court con-
cluded that the acts committed by Marcos in this case were not
performed in his official capacity, but were for his private financial
benefit.'' Such acts do not fall within the definition of an act of
state. 32
Another way to acquire federal subject matter jurisdiction over
former heads of state is through 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which gives the
courts jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. 3 8 The 1970 Declaration of Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Nations and Cooperation Among
Nation States'34 recognizes that the human rights obligations con-
tained within the United Nations Charter are now mandatory, and
they are in fact a "duty" of the states.3 5 Since the United Nations
Charter itself is a treaty, a violation of the fundamental rights of
humans would clearly be a violation of international law.3 6
125. Republic of the Philippines, civ. no. 86-0213.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The courts reasoning reflects the holdings in both Kalamazoo Spice Extrac-
tion v. Provisional Mil. Gov., 729 F.2d 422 (1984) and Victory Transports, Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
132. Id. For definition of act of Atate (or public act in terms of the restrictive theory of
immunity) see supra notes 31 and 79 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 1 for cases using this approach.
134. See infra note 140 at 882, quoting from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
135. Paust, Do Standards of International Rights Have a Place in American Courts?
The Answer May Surprise You, 10 HuM. RTs. J. 41, 42 (Winter 1982).
136. Id.
[Vol. 18
16
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss2/4
DENYING FORMER HEADS OF STATE IMMUNITY
Currently, no nation dissents from the view that the human
rights guaranteed to all by the United Nations Charter include the
right to be free from torture. 13 7 This has become a part of custom-
ary international law,1"8 and in many case opinions there is a con-
sistent and growing use of human rights norms. In addition to the
United Nations Charter, courts are using treaties to which the
United States is not a signatory as binding authority.13 9
In a recent case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,""0 the Second Circuit
obtained jurisdiction over a foreign official based on the above
human rights principles. In Filartiga, the court held that deliberate
torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates univer-
sally accepted norms of the international law of human rights . 41
Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with pro-
cess by an alien within our borders, federal jurisdiction is met as a
universal basis of jurisdiction.142
The same approach has been recently applied in Ortigas v.
Marcos.'4  The plaintiffs there alleged torture, murder and pro-
longed arbitrary arrest and detention by Ferdinand Marcos when
he was acting president.'1 4 They further alleged that although
Marcos did not personally administer the torture, as did the official
in Filartiga,145 international law should not immunize those in posi-
tion of power and responsibility.'"
In Sison v. Marcos,"7 the Hawaii Federal District court held
that although our country recognizes the Aquino government as the
lawful government of the Philippines and jurisdiction could be
137. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Paust, supra note 135, at 42.
140. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
141. 630 F.2d at 878. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see Note, supra
note 8. Article 5 expressly prohibits torture. The essential characteristic of crimes of univer-
sal interest is outlined supra in text accompanying note 100.
142. Id. The "Alien Tort Claims Acts" 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
143. Civ. no. c-86-0975-sw (N.D. Cal. July, 1986).
144. Id.
145. 630 F.2d at 876, see text accompanying note 140 supra.
146. Id. This case is still pending in the Ninth Circuit. The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. All parties filed
their briefs, and the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments for this case and a similar case filed
by the A.C.L.U., Sison v. Marcos civ. no. 86-0225 (D. Hawaii July 18, 1986). (see infra note
194 and accompanying text), on about June 10, 1987. As a result, the court invited the
Justice Department to file an amicus brief, within sixty days, on all issues, but primarily the
issue of the Act of State Doctrine. By requesting the Justice Department to file a brief, the
court was, in essence, deferring to the executive branch (or more specifically, the State De-
partment). See also, supra note 2.
147. Civ. no. 86-0225 (D. Hawaii July 18, 1986).
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found under 28 U.S.C. section 13501'8 the court is precluded from
inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory.1 49
Even though our laws provide the courts with jurisdiction over a
former, or acting, head of state in claims involving violations of
internationally accepted human rights, 50 the lower courts continue
to rely on the Act of State Doctrine to take the issue out of their
control because of their fear of conflicting with the executive
branch. Another case decided recently in the Southern District
Court of California, Guintos v. Marcos,'5' represents the Court's
hesitance in putting less importance in the Act of State Doctrine.
The issue ii, Guinto was whether First Amendment rights are an
internationally accepted human right for the purposes of the alien
tort jurisdictional provision.1 52
During the 1970s, plaintiffs were making a film based on the
Marcos regime. They alleged that Marcos had the film confiscated
and then fabricated a felony against plaintiffs, to force them to flee
from the Philippines. Plaintiffs alleged diversity federal questions
and alien tort jurisdiction. The diversity claim was dismissed be-
cause both Guinto, the plaintiff, and Marcos, the defendant, were
citizens of the Philippines. The court also stated that in order for
the plaintiffs to gain access to the defendant and his assets under
federal question jurisdiction, alien tort jurisdiction first had to be
shown. Because no other applicable United States law was alleged,
it was necessary to show a violation of international law.' 53
In analyzing the alien tort section, the court noted that although
our country strongly upholds First Amendment rights, a violation
of free speech does not rise to the level of a universally recognized
right. 15 Therefore Marcos' acts did not constitute a violation of the
Law of Nations. 55 As a result, the action was dismissed and no
appeal has been filed. Guinto56 shows that jurisdictional issues may
be more problematic for plaintiffs, who bring suit against former
heads of state, than immunity issues.
148. The district courts have original jurisdiction "of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
149. Id.
150. See Filartig v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
151. Civ. no. 86-0737 R(CM) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1986).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
[Vol. 18
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss2/4
DENYING FORMER HEADS OF STATE IMMUNITY
An argument that was not presented in that case may be made
through the FSIA. In fact, future plaintiffs may find that the FSIA
provides a basis for jurisdiction over former heads of state.
B. The FSIA
The United States advanced its view of principles of international
law in the FSIA. By codifying and adopting the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity, which restricts a state's immunity to its
public or governmental acts, the FSIA provides the courts with an-
other exception to the Act of State Doctrine.157 Section 1602 of the
FSIA provides that foreign state's claims of immunity should be
decided by United States federal and state courts, in conformity
with the principles set forth in the Act.5 8 Thus, the issue would be
removed from the hands of the executive branch.
The FSIA disallows granting immunity in litigation involving the
private acts of a sovereign. 159 "Foreign state," as defined by the
FSIA, is the state, its agencies 60 and instrumentalities."6 ' Legisla-
tive. history does not address the issue of head of state immunity, so
it is uncertain whether heads of state could be included in the defi-
nition of a foreign state. 62 If heads of state were interpreted as
being "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," which is a
separate legal person and which is an organ of a foreign state,"6 "
the FSIA would apply to heads of state.'6 The United States
courts have not yet applied this interpretation to heads of state, nor
to former heads of state. 6 5
Since the FSIA provides that federal and state courts have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
157. Note, supra note 8 at 173, n. 19.
158. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982)).
159. Note, supra note 8 at 173, n. 15.
160. An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is defined as any entity,
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporation or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . or created under the
laws of any third country. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (b).
161. Id.
162. Note, supra note 8, at 169.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1603; see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. See note, supra note 8, at 172, n. 15. Heads of state have, in the past, been
treated as diplomats for the purposes of immunity (see supra note 31 and accompanying
text). Since diplomats may fall under this definition, it follows that heads of state may also
be considered an instrumentality of a foreign state.
165. Note, supra note 8, at 175.
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to any claim for relief where the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity, 6 United States courts could analyze head of state im-
munity in terms of the Act. If such were the case, immunity would
be denied to heads of state and former heads of state in the follow-
ing cases: (1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity;1 67
(2) in which the action is based upon commercial activity carried
on in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
a foreign state elsewhere, and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States;1 8 (3) in which rights in property taken in violation
of international law are at issue;169 (4) in which rights in property
in the United States acquired by succession or gift or rights in im-
movable property situated in the United States are at issue;17 or
(5) in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury, death or damage to property occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that state while acting
within the scope of his employment or office.171
Most of the exceptions created in the FSIA reflect United States
case law.1 72 Each provides principles for use in deciding when heads
of state should be immune from jurisdiction in the United States.
Once the courts apply this interpretation to heads of state, the same
argument may be made for former heads of state. In addition, sec-
tion 1604 of the FSIA states that "subject to existing international
agreements . . . a foreign state shall be immune." The ambiguity
of this phrase allows for a broad interpretation. It may be read to
include a general exception to immunity for a human rights viola-
tion.' In fact, "existing international agreements" may also create
a general exception for violations of a foreign sovereign of interna-
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1330.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1). In other words, where a foreign state has allowed itself
to be subject to the jurisdiction of United States Courts.
168. Id. at subsection (2). This reflects the restrictive theory of immunity. See supra
notes 31 and 91, and accompanying text.
169. Id. at subsection (3). See, for example, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at subsection (3). Here jurisdiction is based on the fact that the res in dispute
is within the territory of the United States.
171. Id. at subsection (5). Although this exclusion is limited to torts committed in the
United States, crimes of international law provides an exclusion for crimes of universal inter-
est. The essential characteristic is that a state may participate in the repression of crimes of
universal interest even though: (1) they were not committed in its territory, (2) were not
committed by one of its nationals, or (3) were not otherwise within its jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and enforce. These crimes may include piracy, genocide, slave trade, war crimes or
acts of violence against diplomats. SWEENY, OLIVER & LEECH, supra note 13, at 120-21.
172. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
173. Paust, supra note 135, at 43.
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tional laws, whether or not human rights are involved. 174
The FSIA may also provide courts with another basis of jurisdic-
tion . 75 In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,17 6 the central
question presented to the United States Supreme Court was
whether Congress exceeded the scope of Article III by granting
federal subject matter jurisdiction over non-federal causes of action
between aliens and foreign states.177 Chief Justice Burger first con-
strued section 1330178 of the FSIA to allow suits by aliens against
foreign states. 179 Although the Act itself did not mention suits by
aliens, it applies to "any nonjury civil action against a foreign state
.. .with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immu-
nity."' 80 By holding that a suit against a foreign state under the
Act necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law, the Su-
preme Court makes clear for the first time that such a suit indispu-
tably falls within even a narrow reading of the "arising under" lan-
guage of Article 111.181 Application of this rationale and an
interpretation that the FSIA includes heads of state within its defi-
nition provides the United States courts with a solution to the juris-
dictional problem.
IV. A PROPOSED GUIDELINE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF FORMER HEADS OF STATE IMMUNITY
The historical aspects and purposes of the doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity are as important today as they were one hundred years
ago.182 Internationally, reciprocal independence is upheld. The
United States, as well as other foreign countries, grants foreign sov-
ereigns immunity from jurisdiction within its territory so that later
it may also be free from the jurisdiction of foreign states.'83 As
174. Id. This section may contain the customary international law violation exception
to immunity. See supra notes 73, 119, 141 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
176. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
177. Id. at 1970.
178. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . as to any claim for relief
...with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.
179. Verlinden B.V. 461 U.S. 480, 489.
180. Id. at 489.
181. Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Sovereign Immunity-An Action Brought by An
Alien Against A Foreign Sovereign Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act "Arises
Under" Federal Law, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, at 209 (1983).
182. See Kilrov v. Windsor (Prince Charles, the Prince of Wales, et. al.), Civ. Action
No. C-78-29 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
183. Carl, supra note 39, at 1010.
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time passed, the United States found itself considering other com-
pelling interests such as the adjudication of the claims of its citi-
zens who were doing business with foreign governments."8 4 The
United States has extended its concerns to that of violations of in-
ternationally accepted human rights.' 85
This comment, keeping the above concerns in mind, outlines a
categorized approach to resolving issues of former head of state im-
munity. Because the issue rests upon the type of activity the foreign
state or sovereign is involved in, it is necessary to put them into
three categories. These categories are 1) public or official acts while
acting head of state; 2) private and commercial acts while acting
head of state, and 3) all acts committed after resignation, deposi-
tion, impeachment or the like.
First, there are public or political acts which the former head of
state committed while he was the acting ruler. Following the princi-
ples behind the Act of State Doctrine,1 86 public or official acts, in
pursuit of a state's legitimate public purpose, must be protected.
Thus, the United States should not judge the political actions of a
foreign head of state. Not only would it be judging the head of
state but it would also be judging the foreign government. Foreign
policies are within the executive branch's control, and United
States courts would over-step their bounds in adjudicating these
matters. 1
87
The definition of "public" or "official" acts may change, depend-
ing upon the political belief of the one who is attempting to define
it. Various factors must be considered. These are:
1) the form of government the head of state represents;
2) the laws. of the foreign country the head of state represents;
and
3) internationally accepted laws.
To illustrate this point, the facts of Sison v. Marcos'8 are help-
ful. In Sison, plaintiffs were victims of personal representatives of
victims of torture, arbitral arrest, prolonged detention without trial,
disappearance and presumed summary execution during the period
of 1966 to 1986 in the Republic of the Philippines."' At that time,
184. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 1.
189. Sison, supra note 1, Plaintiff's Complaint, at 2.
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Ferdinand E. Marcos was the president.190 General Fabian C. Ver
was Military Chief of Staff.191 Plaintiff Jose Maria Sison was
widely regarded as an outspoken opponent to the Marcos adminis-
tration and the leader of Nationalist Youth, a political organization
that was established in 1964.192
Because Mr. Sison was a leader against the Marcos regime, he
was subjected to arrest, harassment and assassination attempts in
the Philippines and finally went into hiding in 1968.93 In 1977, he
and his family were arrested without a warrant, taken to a Military
Security Unit of the Philippine Army and later beaten and interro-
gated. This continued until he was released by order of President
Corazon Aquino following the departure of Marcos in February,
1986.194
In this case the Philippines government, although lead by a mili-
tary regime during the Marcos years, was governed by a Constitu-
tion." The Constitution contained a bill of rights, which was
modeled after that of the United States. 196 In those bill of rights it
stated that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. 1 9 7 Moreover, the law of nations pro-
hibits torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial
and summary execution of individuals.19 8 This Comment assumes
that the Sison facts are true and Marcos was responsible for these
acts for the purposes of this discussion. Based on these laws, it can
be reasonably concluded that the acts committed against Mr. Sison
were not public or official acts in pursuit of a states' legitimate pub-
lic purpose. The fact that Marcos departed and a new president
took over infers that the Philippine citizens determined that Marcos
was acting for his own benefit, and outside the scope of his official
capacity. If Marcos was not breaking the laws of the Philippine
Constitution and was acting to protect the public from Mr. Sison,
then his acts would be immune. Under the circumstances set out
above, Marcos' acts do not fall under the first category.
A general definition of "public acts", which leaves room for in-
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id. at 8.
195. E. Fernando, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, at 276 (1970).
196. Id. at 264.
197. Id. Article III § 1(1)
198. See supra note 189.
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terpretation, may be those acts, committed by a sovereign who is
acting as a public power, that are designed to give effect to a state's
public interest.199 The Second Circuit in Victory Transports v.
Comisaria Generalde Abstecimientos y Transportes,00 specified
five situations which it defined as public acts,"0 1 which may be ana-
lyzed in conformity with the above definition.
Another way of determining public acts is to distinguish them
from private and commercial acts, which leads us to the second
category: private and commercial acts which the former head of
state committed while he was the acting ruler. Here, foreign rela-
tions concerns are not as compelling as those of individuals who
privately interact with foreign rulers.2"' If it is determined, through
the analysis below, that the former ruler would not have been enti-
tled to immunity for the acts he committed at the time he was act-
ing as the recognized head of state, then immunity would not at-
tach after he was retired, deposed, impeached or the like.
Generally, private acts may be defined as those acts, committed
by a sovereign who is acting outside an official capacity, that are
designed to further a private interest. Included in this definition are
commercial acts, which are reiterated in the FSIA; °0 acts commit-
ted in violation of the sovereign's own laws;204 and acts which vio-
late internationally accepted laws."0 5
In the Sison example, Marcos' actions against Sison were argua-
bly done in furtherance of his regime. If the laws of the Philippine
Constitution reflect what was "for the public good," then Marcos
acted in a private capacity to protect his position and maintain
power because he violated the laws of the Philippines. In addition,
the acts were in violation of the law of nations.
By interpreting the FSIA to include heads of state in the defini-
tion of "agency or instrumentality, ' 20 6 the courts may use the
FSIA as a guideline for establishing commercial acts. Acts commit-
199. See supra notes 94, 100 and accompanying text; see also Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 538, at 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
200. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
201. See supra note 90.
202. See supra notes 61, 76, 92 and 100 and accompanying text.
203. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602, 1603, 1605 (1982); see also, supra notes 167-171 and
accompanying text.
204. In U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, the Supreme Court Stated: "No man in this coun-
try is so high that he is above the law. No office of the law may set that law at defiance, with
impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
that law and are bound to obey it."
205. See supra note 61, 95, 108-109, 118-119, 133-141 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 160.
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ted in violation of the sovereign's own laws should not be protected
because this would contradict all policy arguments in favor of reci-
procity and comity."'7 The problem with this is that courts may
have to scrutinize the laws of a foreign state. But in the alternative,
if none of the compelling interests, stated above, are present, this
argument is irrelevant to the issue of immunity.20 8 For example,
Corazon Aquino is the recognized president of the Philippines. The
Philippines waived immunity in Marcos' case. 09 Concerns of com-
ity and reciprocity are not in issue because the Philippines, as a
sovereign state, will not be embarrassed politically if the United
States heard the claim against Marcos.
Recently, United States courts have been refusing to grant im-
munity in cases where international law has been violated. 10 Since
the United States incorporates international law as its law, viola-
tions of it may not be protected. Again, the FSIA may help the
courts in analyzing acts in violation of international law.
2
'
The third category is all acts which are subject to the laws of the
United States, committed by the former head of state, who is no
longer the acting head of state nor recognized by the United States
as such. If the former head of state is within the territory of the
United States and is acting in a private status here, s/he should be
treated as if s/he had never been a sovereign. Hence, the laws of
the United States should apply equally to her/him as they would to
any other citizen. Immunity should not attach to the person. Only
acts of foreign sovereigns should be protected. Of course, these ar-
guments apply provided that the courts of the United States have
jurisdiction over the former head of state's person and/or proper-
ties. The facts of Sison would not fall under this category since the
claim arose in the Philippines, before Marcos was deposed and
before he came to the United States.
The above proposal simplifies the issue of former head of state
immunity and is open to interpretation. The central idea is to avoid
supposing that "every case of controversy which touches foreign re-
207. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. If a ruler violates the laws of his
country, he is not acting in furtherance of the public interest. Therefore, granting him immu-
nity would not advance the interests of American foreign policy.
208. Forum non conveniens and other doctrines of the court may be a more appropri-
ate means for discussing this issue.
209. Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
210. See supra notes 72, 100 and 140 and accompanying text.
211. Section IV B of this comment provides an analysis. See supra notes 173-181 and
accompanying text.
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lations lies beyond judicial cognizance." '212
CONCLUSION
Today, United States courts face many problems concerning
head of state immunity. In all of the recent cases against Ferdinand
Marcos, the courts struggle to find standards which allow courts to
hear these claims without infringing upon the executive branch's
power to regulate foreign affairs. The FSIA and United States case
law provide viable solutions to the United States jurisdictional
problems regarding former heads of state found within its territory.
For example, because torture is a universally recognized human
rights violation and therefore a United States law, our courts have
jurisdiction to decide the issue of immunity. This is supported with
a great deal of recent case authority. Yet in the case of Sison, the
federal district court refused to recognize the Law of Nations."'3 It
chose instead to apply the Act of State Doctrine.
Ferdinand Marcos was once recognized by the United States as
the lawful president of the Philippines. That is no longer true, and
many lawsuits are being brought against him for numerous viola-
tions. Those violations of international law, Philippine law and ba-
sic human rights violations should not go unnoticed. Since case law
does not provide courts with a standard in which to justly adjudi-
cate these claims against Marcos, and future former heads of state,
attorneys must use arguments not yet considered. This Comment's
proposal may simplify the issue.
The immunity issue is only one in which the courts must over-
come. Even if the courts denied immunity to former heads of state,
jurisdiction, statute of limitations, forum non conveniens and other
issues must be resolved. So if the United States courts decided to
make a brightline rule that former heads of state should be denied
immunity from jurisdiction, the claim could still be dismissed be-
cause the acts were committed beyond the statutory time limit or
because the foreign state would be a more appropriate forum.
Lisa J. Damiani*
212. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986)
(quoting from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
213. See supra note 146. The question of whether the district court prematurely
granted defendant's motion to dismiss is pending before the ninth circuit.
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